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“Beyond words,” yes, but also beyond numbers
Commentary on Safina on Animals Feel

Fred L. Bookstein
Department of Statistics, University of Washington
Abstract: Safina’s fascinating series of fifty separate feuilletons tries to bridge a painful
Methodenstreit in contemporary ethology mainly by an accumulation of anecdotes. Some deal
with his own dogs, but most derive from reading or conversing with observers of a wider range
of social mammals including elephants, wolves, apes, and whales. In spite of the many
interruptions by travesties of the academic lifestyle and its literature, there is a point to be
made, concerning the centrality of evidence about cooperative behavior styles, especially
aspects of child-rearing, for the understanding of “what animals think and feel.” But Safina’s
argument would be a lot more persuasive, at least to this outsider, if he were more aware of his
own methodological preferences and the restraints they impose on the rhetoric of scientific
persuasion. In spite of my skepticism, I sketch a possible application of his ideas to human
neuroteratology.
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“Science is confirming the obvious…”
Safina, 2015:23
“For the animal shall not be measured by man”
Henry Beston, 1928
(as quoted by Safina, 2015:x)

The most important word in this book is the little logical trope “obvious” (or, adverbially,
“obviously”). It occurs 31 times here, of which the instance in my epigraph is the first: “Science
is confirming the obvious: other animals hear, see, and smell with their ears, eyes, and noses;
are frightened when they have reason for fright and feel happy when they appear happy”
(Safina, 2015, page 23). Here are some of the others: “It is obvious ... that elephants don’t have
romantic love” (page 29). “Obviously, the dog wants to go out” (page 30). “Wolves, apes,
elephants, whales — obviously bright” (page 192). [That dogs understand the existence of other
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minds] is “happening all around us, twenty-four/seven, blindingly obvious” (page 249).
“Obviously many, many animals know the difference between themselves and the rest of the
world” (page 276, in the course of a lampoon of the Gallup mirror test). [But note that the
methodology I am invoking here, the censusing of a verbal behavior, is one that Safina himself
firmly deprecates.]
So if there is a scientific methodology for “confirming the obvious,” well, what kind of
methodology might it be? The closest I can come to it from inside the standard canon is the
approach that Peirce (1934) named “abduction” (in contemporary artificial intelligence it is
called “inference to the best explanation”). As he characterized it in 1903,
• The surprising fact, C, is observed;
• But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
• Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
For a multitude of instances of this specific logical tactic, see Bookstein (2014).
What could such a dependence mean in a context of interspecies understanding? Safina notes,
as early as page 25, that “all the evidence indicates widespread consciousness.” But obviously
[sic] any such assertion must be based on a specific construal of the word “evidence,” a
construal that might not be shared with other branches of the science (broadly, evolutionary
psychology) to which Safina is most closely affiliated. What counts as evidence? Is it only what
counts, i.e., numbers and their statistics?
Apparently not, as the bulk of this book is a retelling of anecdotes, separate stories of the
behaviors observed in individual animals at individual moments over the history of our
observations of them. Hardly any of these purported behavioral trends can be confirmed in
experiments with controlled stimuli: that is, they cannot be counted. For Safina is not
particularly interested in reproducibility. As he admits after one particularly evocative story,
“one dolphin sought and accepted help, one didn’t” (page 369). The animals involved are mainly
(though not exclusively) mammals, more precisely the social mammals, those characterized by
cooperative hunting and rearing and, typically, by fission-fusion community structures that
require keeping track of a lot of distinct individuals. In the background lurk some solid principles
of evolutionary neurology. The brains of the species under discussion here — elephants, wolves,
apes, orca — are overwhelmingly more similar to ours than they are different; ergo, their modes
of function can be expected to overlap; ergo, when we see in an animal a behavior that
resembles a human behavior that we know to be a manifestation of conscious thinking or
feeling, there is no good reason to reject the analogous claim as a proximal explanation of the
analogous animal behavior.
Not so fast, please. From a hypothesis (Peirce’s “there is reason to suspect”) to an assertion of
fact is quite a leap. Here is a typical example, from page 247:
“The swan just showed that he understood that he needed to avoid the dogs and that he
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understood the limitations of their movement in water. He understands how to use the
water to stay completely safe while holding himself so close that, were he on land, the
dogs could cover the distance in two bounds, requiring perhaps half a second. The swan
demonstrated theory of mind and mastery of medium.”
“Not proven,” as the Scots would say. To treat this observation (which is, after all, an anecdote,
not claimed to be any sort of repeatable result) as a demonstration of “understanding” is simply
to beg the question I’ve been probing throughout this commentary. If it is not treated as
“obvious,” is there, in fact, any reason to treat this use of the word “understand” as true?
Nowhere in this book, notwithstanding the range of mockeries of evolutionary psychology in
Part III, “Whines and Pet Peeves,” can I find any discussion of this crucial logical hinge. One
cannot circumvent the “Hard Problem” of consciousness (its inherence in biologically organized
matter) just by privileging one of its domains, the verbal: likewise for Safina’s theory of animal
minds, which privileges the social. On page 29 we are informed that “in science, the simplest
interpretation of evidence is often the best,” but to presume that this “simplicity” is a matter of
the individual cognitive faculty rather than the Denkkollektiv is a deep misunderstanding of
everything we know about the social structure of science today. And Safina’s book is squarely
set within that same social structure: he is, after all, the inaugural Professor of Nature and
Humanity at Stony Brook University.
A biologist like me finds it hard to imagine a current book by a professor of natural sciences that
includes not a single figure, not a single table. To appreciate a table is perhaps a modern human
artifact, but to appreciate a figure need not be (even according to Safina himself, who quotes an
account of dolphins looking at drawings of dolphins). It would be well, then, to search the
domain of human psychology for the traces of subdisciplines that likewise eschew graphical
aids. And one comes obviously to mind, the one founded by Freud (who comes off pretty well in
Safina’s pages): depth psychology and, more generally, abnormal human psychology.
Indeed the claims of clinical psychology are often conveyed in stories, not tables. In Ann
Streissguth’s (1997) magisterial summary of the clinical facies of fetal alcohol syndrome, the
core of the exposition is the “vignettes,” the individual case studies. The most widely read
popular exposition about this disease, Michael Dorris’s (1989) bestseller The Broken Cord,
summarizes the situation of his fetal-alcohol-affected son:
“My son will forever travel through a moonless night with only the roar of wind for
company. Don’t talk to him of mountains, of tropical beaches. Don’t ask him to swoon at
sunrises or marvel at the filter of light through leaves. He’s never had time for such
things, and he does not believe in them. He may pass by them close enough to touch on
either side, but his hands are stretched forward, grasping for balance instead of
pleasure. He doesn’t wonder where he came from, where he’s going. He doesn’t ask
who he is, or why. Questions are a luxury, the province of those at a distance from the
periodic shock of rain. Gravity presses Adam so hard against reality that he doesn’t feel
the points at which he touches it. A drowning man is not separated from the lust for air
by a bridge of thought — he is one with it — and my son, conceived and grown in an
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ethanol bath, lives each day in the act of drowning. For him there is no shore.” (page
264)
In terms of human studies of fetal alcohol syndrome, Dorris’s kind of argument wins the battle
hands-down. Descriptions of the syndrome by averages or correlations of psychological test
scores support neither effective diagnosis nor effective understanding, and the best methods
for detecting the actual brain damage done by prenatal alcohol (for an overview, see NCBDDD,
2004), which are image-based, do not align with the reasons that we actually care about this
particular epigenetic syndrome, namely, its devastating effects on adult life in a modern
Western society (Streissguth et al., 2004). Their poetic diction aside, Safina’s stories in Beyond
Words are set in this same rhetoric: depth-psychological, not scientific, narrative. We are told
about the mental state of another, or rather, an Other, to which we are bound by a tie that is in
Dorris’s case social (his son was adopted) but, for Safina, the tie is evolutionary: we are all
mammals together.
This originally sociological method of Verstehen, understanding the Other through empathy, lies
at the core of the contemporary humanities. It is indeed a style of persuasion. To what extent it
overlaps with the objectifying, reductionist methods of contemporary science, if it overlaps at
all, is an arena of energetic intellectual contention just now. Rather, in directing our attention to
the overlap of animal consciousness with our own, it speaks to the general theme that “in
wildness is the preservation of the world,” a heightened regret for the depredations of human
overpopulation on the freedom of these animals to continue as what they were before the
evolution of Homo sapiens. The tradition to which this book most belongs is indeed the
literature of conservation, not ethology. Its closest current companion is probably Wilson’s
(2016) call for preservation of prehuman ecologies in general.
Then to ask whether Safina’s rich and rewarding volume is ethology, or biology, or science at all,
is not a fruitful line of commentary. Where he refers to numbers (animal demographics, titres of
testosterone), it is dry and desiccated. But where it recounts stories, it becomes powerful in the
same way that fiction and myth become powerful. The power of this prose derives from our
ability, as human readers, to see ourselves in the situation being described. Indeed, to see
ourselves in two roles at the same time: the elephant matriarch (for example) and also the
ethologist observing her.
Like any other academic, Safina is aware of this antinomy. As he says, on page 365,
“Me, I am most skeptical of those things I’d most like to believe, precisely because I’d
like to believe them. Wanting to believe something can skew one’s view.”
This is the dilemma of his readers as well. When he says, as on page 244, “Your dog really does
love you....Your dog genuinely loves you,” what is the role of the adverbs “really” and
“genuinely”? Surely they are not statements about the dog; they are statements about Safina’s
own beliefs. Was the text intended to persuade a skeptic, or only to make the reader who
already credits such a proposition feel better? I suspect the latter is the case. Knowing that you
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want to believe something (in this setting, the claims of animal thinking and feeling, like reading
about how desperately elephants or orca protect their “babies” — and note the emotional
dominance of that word over a more neutral alternative like “offspring”) ought to reset the
reader’s persiflage detector to a very sensitive threshold. This is a commonplace of scientific
inference nowadays, especially in the physical sciences (in Freeman Dyson’s (2004, page 258)
trenchant bon mot, “the professional duty of a scientist confronted with a new and exciting
theory is to try to prove it wrong”). The principle does not match Safina’s stance too well.
Safina musters a great mass of evidence about what is “obvious” in the contemporary ethology
of mental processes. That he never pauses to examine what he himself might mean by a slogan
like “Science has confirmed the obvious” is not necessarily a drawback from the point of view of
his intended readership. Yes, it might interfere with the dissemination of his ideas into the
academic sector in which he presently lives. But his own words indicate his near-total disdain for
the intellectual styles that are currently fashionable in that sector. We may not be able to
ascertain the disciplinary impact of this book for decades. Meanwhile, it is worth cherishing for
its narrative energy and the elegance of its language. Beyond Words was designed not to
convince you of anything, but rather to make you think and imagine. In that purpose, I believe it
succeeds splendidly.
Acknowledgement. These comments derive partly from my presentation “Limits of ‘the scientific method’ in nearly
normal brains” at the Third Vienna Conference on Consciousness, November 6–7, 2015, with support from the
Faculty of Biological Sciences of the University of Vienna.
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